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Abstract 
 
Thesis:  
Degree Project in Business Administration for Master of Science in Business and 
Economics, 30 credits. 
 
Problem: 
Transforming accounting standards into effective and sensible reporting practices has 
shown to increase the pressure on enforcement, as it has the power to promote 
consistent application across countries. Prior literature has acknowledged the 
increased importance of enforcement, as a result, the field of study has received 
greater attention in recent years. Findings of recent research point towards 
considerable differences in how IFRS is implemented, ascribing a lot of explanatory 
value to differences in enforcement. Even though these studies provide evidence that 
enforcement systems are different, the majority of research is limited in the sense that 
it does not focus on actual practices. Thus, it is interesting to investigate how well 
coordinated the member states are and how national enforcers differ in actual 
practices. 
 
Purpose: 
The purpose of this paper is to identify differences in how enforcement of IFRS is 
carried out on national level within Europe. 
 
Research Question: 
How does enforcement of IFRS differ on national level within Europe? 
 
Research Design: 
The study is based upon a qualitative descriptive study, with a primary research 
approach based on semi-structured interviews, with representatives from nine 
enforcement bodies. Empirical findings were then analysed through a comparison 
with prior literature.  
 
Findings: 
Throughout the research process we have identified that national enforcement bodies 
differ in several areas, why we use the term significant differences for areas we want 
to highlight in the analysis. These have been categorized into seven areas: structures, 
resources legal authority, examination approach, results of examination, sanctions 
and the European corporation of enforcement overseen by ESMA, where amongst 
structures and legal authority has shown to be the root to the majority of other 
differences. 
 
Future Research:  
A primary suggestion would be to expand the sample and include more influential 
countries. To conduct a quantitative study examining the availability of information 
among enforcers would also contribute to the research area. Lastly, a study with 
similar purpose conducted after the implementation of the consultation paper from 
ESMA would be of interest.  
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1.	  Introduction	  	  
We can often read about new laws being passed, the subsequent reaction often being 
something like “if we have a problem all we do is to pass a new law!” This view 
might indicate that the regulatory answer to a problem is enough to foster compliance, 
since a new law is simply what is needed to deter certain behaviour (Russell, 1990). 
Many times we lose interest in the result of the new law. What is missing in these 
situations are resources and structures to mend the minds of violators and provide 
sufficient incentives to behave in a socially accepted way, i.e. enforcement. Looking 
back just two decades we have experienced two severe financial crises, reminding us 
that laws are just another piece in a much larger puzzle called financial regulation. 
 
European financial market liberalisation and the creation of the single market started a 
process of restructuring and scale enlargement in European accounting. As a step in 
this process, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) became mandatory 
for all listed firms within Europe in 2005, taking another step to connect Europe in 
terms of regulatory harmonization. The effects of IFRS have occupied researchers for 
close to a decade and in principle, IFRS has the potential to enhance the quality of 
financial statements (Ding et al., 2007; Bae et al., 2008), facilitate comparability 
across countries (Armstrong et al., 2008), lower barriers to cross-border investment 
(Bradshaw et al., 2004; Aggarwal et al., 2005; Yu, 2009) and promote investor 
confidence (Barth et al., 1999; Kavanagh, 2013). 
 
All the above-mentioned benefits rely on the assumption that the issuers of financial 
statements follow the adopted rules, which has proven to be a challenging task (e.g 
Berger, 2010; Pope and McLeay, 2011). Scholars argue that a common set of 
standards is just part of the harmonization process. Without a well-functioning 
enforcement system the standards will be implemented inconsistently, hampering 
comparability and making real convergence unachievable (Ball, 2006; Leuz, 2010; 
Cai et al., 2008). The Group of 20 (G-20) also acknowledges enforcement as crucial 
in achieving the objectives of the regulatory framework, arguing that the desired 
outcome is undermined without an effective enforcement mechanism: “It is thus 
essential that participants are appropriately monitored, that offenders are vigorously 
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prosecuted and that adequate penalties are imposed when rules are broken. A 
regulatory framework with strong monitoring, prosecution, and application of 
penalties provides the incentives for firms to follow the rules” (G-20 p. 57). However, 
there are considerable challenges in ensuring consistent enforcement across countries, 
considering the disparity in culture and institutional background:  
 
“In Britain everything is permitted unless it is prohibited. 
In Germany it is the opposite, everything is prohibited unless it is permitted.  
In the Netherlands everything is prohibited even if it is permitted. 
And in France, of course, everything is permitted especially if it is prohibited.” 
   (Sir David Philip Tweedie, former Chairman of IASB, 20101)  
 
At the same time as Europe has grown closer in terms of financial regulation, 
enforcement has not experienced the same convergence, resulting in a gap between 
integration of the financial markets and enforcement of accounting practices. There 
have been numerous attempts to close the gap across Europe, but enforcement is still 
put in the hands of each member state. Decentralized control over enforcement does 
not necessarily provoke inconsistencies, however, it requires well-coordinated 
cooperation. Nonetheless, EU-level coordination has been struggling to promote 
coherent enforcement since the introduction of IFRS. Each national enforcement body 
has the final word in deciding how accounting standards should be enforced. It is 
therefore of crucial interest to examine how all member states enforcement bodies 
work on a daily basis, since the power to prevent and mitigate inconsistencies lie in 
their hands. 
1.1	  Problem	  discussion	  	  	  
The pursuit of harmonized financial markets induced the introduction of IFRS, with 
the ultimate goal of comparable financial reporting across the globe (Dewing and 
Russell, 2008). The adoption of a common set of standards shall, however, not be 
viewed independently from other features of the financial reporting infrastructure. 
Research has shown that, viewed separately the standards are unlikely to promote 
consistent reporting (Ball, 2006). Transforming accounting standards into effective 
and sensible reporting practices has shown to increase the pressure on enforcement, as 
it has the power to promote consistent application. Prior literature has acknowledged 
                                                
1 ”Accounting for financial reform”, speech Japan Society, 7th of April 2010. 
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the increased importance of enforcement, as a result, the field of study has received 
greater attention in recent years (e.g Christensen et al., 2013; Daske et al., 2008; 
Berger, 2010; Brown et al., 2014). Findings of their research point towards 
considerable differences in how IFRS is implemented, ascribing a lot of explanatory 
value to differences in enforcement. Even though these studies provide evidence that 
enforcement systems are different, the majority of research is limited in the sense that 
it does not focus on actual practices. This is also recognized by Leuz (2010), who 
argues that systems that seem similar in terms of design and structure might still differ 
considerably in actual practices. A conclusion that can be drawn from the literature is 
that rules of the game are different in practice than how they are theoretically 
intended to work. In order to fully analyse the enforcement system, one has to look 
beyond the formal rules in order to capture the informal application, as the formal 
view of legal institutions might not work as predicted in practice (Siegel, 2005). With 
this in mind, we question whether prior literature evaluates enforcement per se, 
considering that actual practices have been left out. The missing link in the majority 
of previous studies intrigued us to examine enforcement where it is actually carried 
out: on national level.  
1.2	  Purpose	  and	  research	  question	  
Given the gap in the research area, focusing on actual practices on national a level 
combined with the intention of IFRS to go global, intrigued us to further develop our 
understanding of the enforcement system in Europe. The purpose of this paper is to 
identify differences in how enforcement of IFRS is carried out on national level within 
Europe. 
 
Considering the discussion above, our research seek to answer the following question:  
• How does enforcement of IFRS differ on national level within Europe? 
1.3	  Delimitations	  	  
In order to make this study feasible and as succinct as possible required certain 
delimitations. Firstly, as given in the research question, we solely examine 
enforcement of listed companies using IFRS. Secondly, the study only involves 
mandatory adopters since they are the only countries connected to the European 
coordination unit: European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). Lastly and 
important to note, we only identify differences in actual practices, prior research 
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centres much around the quality of enforcement, something that is not evaluated in 
this study. 
 
1.4	  Disposition	  	  
 
Introduction	   • In	  this	  chapter	  we	  aim	  to	  present	  the	  research	  problem	  in	  order	  to	  substantiate	  the	  thesis.	  We	  further	  outline	  the	  research	  question	  and	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  study.	  Lastly,	  we	  present	  how	  we	  contribute	  to	  the	  dield	  of	  research.	  
Frame	  of	  References	  
• This	  chapter	  aims	  to	  bring	  forth	  relevant	  literature	  used	  to	  structure,	  interpreting	  and	  analysing	  our	  empirical	  dindings.	  First	  the	  structure	  of	  enforcement	  in	  Europe	  will	  be	  described,	  followed	  by	  an	  outline	  of	  applicable	  theories.	  Lastly,	  we	  present	  closely	  related	  research.	  	  
Methodology	  
• In	  this	  chapter	  our	  aim	  is	  to	  explain	  our	  choice	  of	  methodology	  and	  point	  out	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  research	  design.	  We	  will	  also	  describe	  the	  sample	  process,	  how	  we	  got	  to	  the	  six	  countries	  in	  the	  study.	  Lastly,	  the	  methods	  and	  techniques	  for	  analysing	  the	  empirical	  data	  will	  be	  presented.	  	  	  
Empirical	  Background	   • This	  chapter	  provides	  a	  proper	  foundation	  to	  the	  empricial	  dindings	  by	  presenting	  the	  different	  structures	  and	  features	  of	  respective	  enforcement	  body	  in	  our	  sample.	  
Empirical	  Findings	  
• In	  this	  chapter	  we	  present	  our	  empirical	  dindings	  out	  of	  the	  nine	  interviews	  with	  respondents	  at	  six	  national	  enforcement	  bodies,	  as	  well	  as	  secondary	  data	  gathered	  from	  homepages.	  	  
Analysis	   • In	  this	  chapter	  we	  bring	  together	  our	  empirical	  dindings	  with	  related	  literature	  in	  order	  to	  problematize	  the	  dindings	  and	  give	  suggestions	  for	  improvements.	  
Concluding	  Remarks	  
• In	  the	  last	  chapter	  we	  present	  the	  results	  of	  our	  study	  in	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  research	  question.	  Lastly,	  we	  outline	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  study	  in	  order	  to	  give	  suggestion	  for	  future	  research	  
Figure 1.1 Thesis disposition model. 
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1.5	  Contribution	  
Our research is motivated by the question whether current enforcement structure 
employed in Europe give rise to significant differences in actual practices across 
countries. We explore several elements of enforcement in order to uncover where 
countries differ in practical application. By fulfilling the purpose of this study, we will 
contribute to the literature in two ways. First, in conjunction to the implementation of 
IFRS, several scholars have examined how enforcement is carried out across Europe, 
coming to the conclusion that enforcement is far from harmonized (e.g Berger, 2010; 
Brown and Tarca, 2005; Leuz, 2010). We will expand their research by further 
develop the notion of enforcement in conjunction to IFRS, focusing on actual 
practices rather than differences ‘on paper’. Second, we identify factors of particular 
importance to consider when coordinating enforcement within Europe, which areas 
currently experiencing the largest discrepancies in terms of actual practices.    
 
Our research will be useful to a wide audience, both practitioners and EU-level 
decision makers on the subject of coordination. Additionally, this type of paper will 
also be of interest to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), considering 
their intention to adopt IFRS.   
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2.	  Frame	  of	  Reference	  
This chapter aims to bring forth relevant literature used to structure, interpreting and 
analysing our empirical findings. First the structure of enforcement in Europe will be 
described, followed by an outline of applicable theories. Lastly, we present closely 
related research.  
2.1	  Enforcement	  in	  Europe	  
In order to foster internal market harmonization, the IAS-regulation established a pan-
European coordination unit with responsibility to ensure effective enforcement 
mechanisms across the union. In the following section we will describe how we came 
to the current structure of enforcement and the important functions that influence the 
European cooperation.  
2.1.1	  Background	  IFRS-­‐enforcement	  	  
In June of 2002 the European Parliament and the European Council of Ministers 
passed a regulation on mandatory adoption of IFRS. From 1 of January 2005, all 
companies that had their securities admitted to trading on a regulated marketplace 
within the European Union were duty-bound to prepare their consolidated financial 
reports in accordance with IFRS. The European Commission gave a number of 
reasons for harmonizing the financial reporting system and the reasoning behind 
choosing IFRS. The two main reasons presented by the European Commission were: 
firstly, prior directives failed in ensuring the required level of transparency and 
comparability, which is the basis for building a smooth and efficient integrated capital 
market. Secondly, to ensure compliance the regulation stated that each member state 
was required to take appropriate measures to safeguard consistent application and 
promote investor confidence (Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002). In practice this meant 
that a rigorous enforcement mechanism should be set up at national level. As a 
response, the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) was given a 
supervisory role with the objective to coordinate enforcement on a European level. In 
principle, CESR did not possess any power to conduct enforcement per se; their tasks 
were primarily focused around coordination, an advisory role for the actual 
enforcement bodies (Berger, 2010). 
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2.1.2	  ESMA	  
From 1 of January 2011, CESR was replaced with ESMA, an independent EU 
authority, with purpose to foster supervisory convergence among the member states. 
ESMA continued the work previously carried out by CESR, adding some muscle in 
the form of new powers, including the ability to draft legally binding technical 
standards, participating in on-site inspections, more rigorous emergency powers and a 
new role supervising credit-rating firms (CESR, 2011). The move to ESMA formed 
part of a larger initiative to modernize the overall financial regulatory system. The 
outcome was three supervisory authorities with different agendas (European 
Supervisory Authorities commonly referred to as ESA): European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA), European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority (EIOPA) and European Banking Authority (EBA)2 (Esma.europa.eu). One 
major objective of this coordination effort is to establish a single rulebook for all 
member states, where ESMA contributes by ensuring that investors being treated in 
the same way across the union. Further, the goal is to reach equal conditions for 
companies providing financial services and for these to compete on equal footing. 
2.1.3	  Measures	  	  
The primary tool for ESMA to coordinate enforcement across Europe was built on the 
development of two standards. Standard No. 1, ‘Enforcement of Standards on 
Financial Information in Europe’, was passed in March 2003 and consists of 21 
principles (CESR, 2003). The principles target areas such as how national 
enforcement bodies should be organized, stating that a national independent and 
competent authority should be assigned, alternatively delegated to another body under 
supervision from the competent authority. The process by which firms are selected for 
review is also regulated in Standard No. 1, stating that a mix approach should be used, 
combining a risk-based sample with rotation and/or a sampling approach. Sampling 
solely after risk is acceptable while pure rotation sampling is restricted. The 
appropriate action in the case of material misstatements is not well defined, stating 
that enforcers shall aim to take appropriate action in a timely and consistent manner 
(CESR, 2003). CESR Standard No. 2 ‘Coordination of Enforcement Activities’ from 
April 2004 consists of four principles set out to foster internal market harmonization 
(CESR, 2004). The principles provide specific procedures for national enforcement 
                                                
2 See Appendix 2 for an overview of current- and former structure. 
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bodies to take part in the cooperation overseen by ESMA. Important to note is that 
these principles are set out as minimum requirements, thus give space for 
interpretation. 
2.1.4	  EECS	  	  
Part of the harmonization process was the implementation of ‘European Enforcers 
Coordination Sessions’ (EECS), a forum connected to ESMA, which allows national 
enforcers to meet 8-9 times a year in order to discuss decisions and share experiences. 
The main purpose is to increase convergence among the enforcers and their activities. 
All national enforcers should send representatives to EECS meetings, even non-
ESMA members. There are two types of cases discussed at the meetings: cases that 
are already issued (‘decisions’) and cases that are discussed before they are issued 
(‘emerging issues’). Cases where unclear interpretation is recognized are sent to IASB 
in order to solve inconsistencies in the interpretation of IFRS. In sum, EECS is the 
major forum for national enforcers to exchange experiences and discuss challenges 
ahead. (CESR, 2007) 
2.1.5	  EECS-­‐database 
National enforcers have access to a confidential database with previous cases to seek 
guidance in their practical work. This enables enforcers to find similar issues, and see 
how it has been treated by another enforcer. However, not all cases are presented, 
there are selection criterions to ensure that only cases with ‘accounting merit’3 are 
uploaded. The database is only available to enforcers connected to ESMA (Appendix 
3) besides a few cases, which are made public in the form of extracts on a regular 
basis. The issuance of extracts aims to provide issuers and users of financial 
statements with similar information. The database should not be used to find the 
solution to an individual case, rather used as a supporting function to look for 
guidance. (CESR, 2007) 
2.1.6	  Suggested	  review	  process	  	  
As previously mentioned, ESMA does not possess enforcement authority per se, 
however, based on the tools and measures previously described, ESMA has outlined a 
general framework for how each review shall be undertaken.  
 
                                                
3 Only cases that provide the market with useful guidance have ‘accounting merit’. 
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The process begins with a selection of issuers to be reviewed and as previously 
mentioned, a combination of risk, random sampling and/or rotation approach should 
be considered. ESMA emphasizes an approach where the risk is evaluated both in 
terms of probability of infringements and potential significance in case of detection. 
Other aspects to consider are more nationally oriented, e.g. complexity of financial 
statements and a risk profile derived from management experience. 
 
At a second stage a choice between a complete review and partial review should be 
assessed. A complete review, as the word indicates, refers to an analysis of the full set 
of financial statements, while a partial review focus on certain high-risk areas. Partial 
reviews can be motivated in a number of situations: external indications of 
misstatements, a history of non-compliance or when IFRS is applied for the first time.  
 
The first step when a potential infringement has been identified is to establish a 
formal contact with the issuer, where the matter is brought to the attention of the 
issuer. Additional correspondence might be needed, providing an opportunity for the 
enforcers to ask for further explanations or additional information. The issuer is also 
given the opportunity to defend the treatment, however, ultimately it is up to the 
enforcers to decide whether the treatment is in line with IFRS or not. As a last step, 
the materiality should be assessed. In principle, only cases that are labelled material 
shall result in enforcement actions taken against the issuer. If considered non-
material, the issuer is informed through a notification letter, but further action is 
seldom necessary. 
  
When it has been concluded that a treatment departs from what is acceptable 
according to IFRS and also considered material, there is a wide range actions 
available to the enforcer depending on national law. When the misstatement is 
considered minor, an issuer can be obliged to ‘correct in the next financial 
statements’, where the issuers approve the adoption of an acceptable treatment in 
future financial statements. The enforcer can also require the withdrawal of the 
current financial statement, demanding ‘issuance of revised financial statements 
accompanied by a new audit opinion’. Lastly, the enforcer can also issue a ‘public 
corrective note or other type of communication to the public’. This action entails a 
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press release, informing the market of the misstatement and its effect in the financial 
statements4. 
 
National enforcers may also work proactively to facilitate future enforcement 
processes. ESMA provide some examples of what these activities may involve: 
‘Issuance of alerts indicating the main areas of examination’, which refer to the 
situation where enforcers announce preliminary findings of the current reviews, as 
well as, revealing focus areas in advance of a reporting period. A second example of 
how enforcers may work proactively is: ‘Pre-clearance’, whereby issuers can obtain 
approval in advance of the conclusion of their accounts. In practice this means that an 
issuers approach the enforcers, seeking formal advice on whether a certain treatment 
complies with IFRS or not. (ESMA, 2013) 
2.1.7	  New	  consultation	  paper	  	  
In July 2013, ESMA published a consultation paper aiming to transform Standards 
No. 1 and 2 into guidelines. The consultation paper is extensive and contains a total of 
18 guidelines. An official date for the introduction is still to be announced but it is 
expected to take place late 2014. Below we will present areas that will undergo 
changes and are of particular importance to the analysis of our empirical findings.  
 
Selection methods will be revised, precluding the method of sampling solely after 
risk. Issuers shall always run the risk of being selected, thus a mixed approach will be 
the only acceptable method. Pre-clearance will also undergo changes; from being 
vaguely regulated it will now need to ‘be part of a formal process’. Further, the legal 
authority to request information will be expanded to include both issuers and auditors. 
Enforcers shall be able to request all information necessary, both from issuers and 
auditors and it shall not be limited to situations when suspicions exist. Moreover, 
market operators will no longer be allowed to carry out enforcement as a delegated 
authority. Furthermore, actions will be limited to three actions, namely: restatement, 
corrective note and correction in future financial statements. There will also be more 
guidance regarding when to use which action. Resources have also been targeted in 
the new guidelines, without explicitly outline how to deal with under-resources 
enforcers, some general factors shall be considered when allocating resources. Lastly, 
                                                
4 The issuance can either be undertaken by the issuer or the enforcer, 
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Standard No. 2 will be expanded in an attempt to create a common culture towards 
enforcement. As part of this process, all enforcers shall participate in the EECS 
meetings5. (ESMA/2013/1013)  
                                                
5 As of today, the delegated authorities in Sweden are not obliged to participate. 
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2.2	  Literature	  review	  
Enforcement is a widely studied subject and in this section we aim to provide a 
common starting point in order to understand the concept. Certain areas within the 
research area will be outlined in order to understand the empirical findings, as well as, 
provide a foundation for the analysis.  
2.2.1	  Enforcement:	  mission	  and	  definition	  	  
Given the aim of this study, it is central to distinguish the notion of enforcement from 
other closely related concepts, enabling us to mark a common starting point for what 
is embedded in the concept. 
 
An empirical issue is to disentangle enforcement from regulation and supervision. 
While the actual rulemaking is commonly referred to as regulation and the ex-ante 
activities to prevent noncompliance refers to supervision. Enforcement, on the other 
hand, is an ex-post activity, in place to detect and sanction wrongdoers. Separating 
enforcement and supervision is not an easy task; in practice the two are somewhat 
intertwined, their individual success is dependent on one another. In principle, 
‘enforcement of compliance’ is a common used umbrella term to bring the two 
concepts together (Carvajal & Elliott, 2009). From a philosophic perspective 
enforcement can be said to ‘actualize the law’. By that we assume that enforcement is 
embedded in the word legality, it is something that contributes to law’s identity as 
law. It cannot be assumed to have value by itself; it depends on other constitutional 
grounds on which it develops value. Even though enforcement as a concept is 
theological, law is something created to have effect ‘in the real world’ and the role of 
enforcement is to ensure this demand for effect. (Kleinfeld, 2011) 
In the field of accounting, the majority of scholars seem to view enforcement as a 
cornerstone to promote compliance, where enforcement focuses on detecting and 
sanctioning (May and Burby, 1998; Polinsky and Shavell, 2000; Von Stein, 2010). 
Enforcement can also be described in a broader context, Downs (1997) refers to 
enforcement as a general strategy to deter violations and prevent noncompliance from 
ever taking place. If a violation still manages to slip through, the actual punishment is 
just a tool in the overall strategy to promote compliance. CESR defines enforcement 
as follows: “enforcement is monitoring compliance of financial information with the 
reporting framework and taking action in the case of infringements” (CESR, 2003). 
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In line with the purpose of this study we will, henceforth, refer to CESR’s definition 
of enforcement.    
2.2.2	  Effects	  of	  enforcement	  
Prior literature has found that adoption of the common set of standards is just part of 
the convergence process (e.g. Ball et al., 2000; Leuz et al., 2003; Soderstrom & Sun, 
2007); there are still considerable differences in financial reporting and enforcement 
is going to play a key role in the harmonization puzzle. The aim of this section is to 
highlight the potential benefits of a well-functioning enforcement system, as well as 
the challenges it faces.  
 
Cost of capital  
Given that cost of capital is a fundamental metric for investor and managers alike, 
providing capital at the lowest possible rate was a major motive behind the adoption 
of IFRS. As Arthur Levitt, former Chairman at the SEC once said: “The truth is, high 
quality standards lowers cost of capital” (Levitt, 1998, s. 82). To this end, scholars 
have examined differences in cost of capital across countries, coming to the 
conclusion that the quality and effectiveness of securities regulation is a main driver 
behind cost of capital differences under IFRS (Hail and Leuz, 2006). In the same vein, 
Christensen et al. (2013), provide empirical evidence that improvements in 
enforcement are essential for positive capital-market effects, arguing that the quality 
of enforcement decide the outcome of IFRS.  
 
Incentives 
In respect to accounting quality, there are two branches in the literature. One branch 
argues that the quality of the standards determine accounting quality, whilst the 
second argues that reporting incentives are more important. In line with the latter 
branch, recent research suggests enforcement to be a key motivation to shape firms 
reporting incentives. Daske et al. (2008) find capital-market effects in countries with 
relatively strict enforcement and where the institutional environment provides strong 
incentives for firms to be transparent. Findings also indicate that coordination efforts 
within the EU have had some effect; the positive effects are greater among mandatory 
adopters than voluntary adopters (Hail and Leuz, 2007; Li, 2010).  
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Users  
One of the major objectives with financial reporting enforcement is to ensure that 
accurate information reaches the market, thus a well-functioning enforcement system 
has the potential to enhance the usefulness of financial information. By comparing 
forecast accuracy across jurisdictions, scholars have shown that there exists a positive 
relationship between strong enforcement and forecast accuracy (Hope, 2003; Preiato 
et al., 2010). Similarly, an accurate enforcement mechanism has shown to be an 
essential part in achieving investor confidence (Kavanagh, 2013). Ball (2001) further 
adds to this notion, arguing that firms could send a credible signal to investors by 
cross listing in an environment with stricter enforcement. He further acknowledges 
that differences in enforcement could lead to ‘regulatory arbitrage’6 as issuers have 
the option to influence in which legislative environment they list.   
 
Global convergence  
Pre Enron, the main reason to adopt a common set of standards can be said to be an 
active step towards a harmonized system between the EU and the US (Dewing and 
Russell, 2008). However, the EU has struggled to reach convergence within the 
internal market, which has made the US hesitate to adopt IFRS. Berger (2010) argues 
that differences in enforcement are a contributing factor to why global convergence is 
yet to be reached. On the same notion, Zeff (2007) acknowledges that national 
variations in IFRS are a hurdle in the way of global harmonization. In answer to this, 
Kavanagh (2013) acknowledges that the EECS has a crucial role in coordinating 
national level enforcement to reach consistent enforcement across Europe. 
 
Harmonization or upgrading  
An empirical challenge that arises when talking about effects of enforcement is what 
is embedded in the notion ‘better enforcement’. Some scholars argue that the proper 
way forward is, as with the standards: harmonization. Cai et al. (2008) support this 
statement, arguing that poorly harmonized enforcement hampers accounting quality. 
The other branch of scholars believes that it is a matter of upgrading. If enforcement 
were to be harmonized the number of institutions with interpretational power would 
increase, diluting the role of the standards (Benston et al., 2006). There are examples 
where enforcement has been upgraded constantly for over thirty years and still not 
                                                
6 The situation when companies capitalize on differences or loopholes in a regulatory system is 
commonly referred to as ‘regulatory arbitrage’. 
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been able to sufficiently prevent crises (Becker, 2011). This dilemma has led Leuz 
(2010) to consider a somewhat radical solution to deal with differences in 
enforcement. By creating a supra-national enforcement body, harmonization can be 
reached without interfering with national sovereignty. Firms should opt into this 
‘Global player segment’ with authority to enforce IFRS across jurisdictions. A system 
like this would align both incentives and enforcement activities to enable an overall 
harmonization of the financial reporting system (Leuz, 2010). 
2.2.3	  Principles-­‐	  vs.	  rules-­‐based	  enforcement	  
As researchers examine pros and cons regarding principles- and rules-based 
accounting, there is a parallel debate regarding the enforcement between the two. 
Rules-based enforcement is based on the assumption that there exist qualitative 
standards with clear distinctions between right and wrong, covering most (if not all) 
possibilities, thus is very technical in nature. Further, rules-based enforcement is 
characterized by predictability in the sense that the extent of sanctions can easily be 
calculated in advance. Principles-based enforcement, on the other hand, is based 
around an underlying purpose, hence demanding a higher degree of judgment. In 
addition, principles work in favor of public values and thus less focused around the 
specific case. (Ford, 2008; Park, 2007) 
 
Park (2012) distinguish the two enforcement systems in terms of cost and 
controversy, arguing that rules have well-defined criteria to separate right from 
wrong, facilitating application in specific cases, leading to lower cost of enforcement. 
Principles, on the other hand, require a more extensive investigation due to vague 
definitions, leading to higher cost. The other factor targets whether the offender easily 
can apprehend if a certain treatment will trigger an action or not. Rules demand for a 
technical violation before a significant action can be carried out. Principles, however, 
include generally worded regulations, which can be harder for issuers to apprehend, 
leading to more controversy (Park, 2012). 
 
In contrast to the debate regarding the standards, scholars do not centre on the 
potential benefits of the two, the general concern is rather that principles-based 
standards should be accompanied with principles-based enforcement and vice-versa. 
When not paired up with the same ‘enforcement type’, there is a risk that the overall 
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purpose of a principles-based system goes lost. Ball (2009) believes that it will be a 
challenge for principles-based enforcement systems to stay principle-based; it simply 
does not cope well with the overall logic of enforcement.  
2.2.4	  Strong-­‐	  and	  weak	  enforcement	  	  
There is for obvious reasons an empirical challenge to measure the strength of 
something ‘intangible’ as enforcement. Given these challenges, it is interesting to note 
that scholars still ascribe a lot of explanatory value to the strength of enforcement. 
Pope and McLeay (2011) argue that strong enforcement is crucial for the 
effectiveness of financial markets and weakness of enforcement is a reason for 
variations in IFRS. In order to measure the strength of enforcement, prior research 
seems to be divided into two branches, one that argues that strength is evaluated in 
terms of resources, while the other branch target severity of actions.  
 
In line with the former branch, Jackson and Roe (2009) construct two categories 
based on resources in order to capture enforcement intensity. The first category use 
budgets in comparison to GDP, while the second use staff scaled to population. 
Findings of their research back the argument that strong enforcement has positive 
capital market effects. In the same vein, Carvajal and Elliott (2009) argue that the 
capacity of enforcement (e.g staffing, budget, political will) is vital for an effective 
accounting system.  
 
Within the latter branch, Hitz et al. (2012) find that the stronger enforcement actions 
implemented in Germany have had unfavourable market effects. Firms, which 
received more severe actions, have seen a decline in investor confidence. Ernstberger 
et al. (2012), on the contrary, find positive effects regarding both accounting quality 
and liquidity effects. Even though both articles examine enforcement effects in 
Germany, the results are not straightforward, suggesting that strong enforcement is 
not necessarily one-size-fit-all solution. Other scholars are critical to research trying 
to explain enforcement as either strong or weak. Becker (2011, p. 1889) argues: 
“thinking of enforcement as strong or weak is not especially useful”. Instead he 
suggests that solely focus on being tougher is “a fool’s errand”, it is a matter of being 
more effective. In doing so, enforcement bodies must look further up the chain in 
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order to proactively prevent wrongdoers and identify where the system is breaking 
down.  
2.2.5	  Sanctions	  
In principle, there exist two distinct theories how sanctions7 should be used in the 
enforcement apparatus. Even though none of which specifically refer to securities 
regulation, both are still relevant in analysing how respective enforcement body uses 
sanctions as a tool to enforce IFRS. 
The first theory is built on a study by John Braithwaite (1985) and is often referred to 
as “The Enforcement Pyramid”. It is based on the assumption that most violations are 
in the base of the pyramid and consequently receive gentle actions. Sanctions 
progressively increase while the number of offenders simultaneously decline. The 
idea is a system where offenders in the base will be deterred from being one of few in 
the top of the pyramid. 
The second theory is built on a study by Gary S. Becker (1968) and based on the 
assumption that a wrongdoer only will engage in illegal activities when the benefits of 
the crime exceed the potential cost. According to Becker (1968), enforcers should set 
the probability of detection very low to minimize cost and use high sanctions to 
counter the low probability. This theory is commonly referred to as “Low 
probability/high fine – combination”. 
More recent studies point to other determinants as vital for the success of the 
enforcement system. Becker (2011) questions whether ever increasing penalties is the 
right way to promote compliance. He suggests that deterrence is a matter of 
communication; a wrongdoer needs to be able to apprehend what actions that might 
lead to a certain pain. By focusing on the certainty and the celerity of sanctions, 
compliance can be achieved through efficiency rather than severity (Becker, 2011).  
2.2.6	  Strategies	  of	  enforcement	  
Some scholars do not determine the effectiveness of enforcement in terms of strength, 
instead focusing on managerial choices to distinguish one system from another. May 
and Burby (1998) refer to an article by John Scholz (1994), where he review the 
management side of enforcement. He claims that enforcement can be distinguished by 
strategic choices, defining three main strategies: deterrence, persuasive and 
                                                
7 In regard to literature on enforcement, actions and sanctions are used interchangeably and will thus be 
analysed accordingly. However, sanctions will be presented separated from actions in the empirical 
findings. 
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educational. The strategies can be distinguished from each other by evaluating the 
following factors: allocation of resources, targeting, publicity, use of information and 
sanctions. Even though Scholz (1994) may be one of few scholars to present a 
straightforward concept of strategy, much of the literature is centred on different 
strategies without explicitly using the term strategy. As early studies as Braithwaite 
(1985) addresses the importance of information gathering from enforcement 
activities, mapping where compliance systems are breaking down and learn from 
prior examinations. This view is in line with what Scholz (1994) would categorize as 
educational.  
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2.3	  Related	  empirical	  studies	  
As previously mentioned, there is a lack of studies examining differences on national 
level, however there are a few which have influenced the creation of this paper and 
the aim of this section is to bring forth these studies. 
 
Berger (2010) examines the development and status of enforcement within Europe by 
reviewing enforcement on national level, providing evidence of considerable 
differences. The main areas of concern, presented in his paper are: scope of 
assignments, actions, legal authority and error rate. Without ranking the findings in 
his study, it is safe to say that a major finding was discrepancies in reported errors8. 
This made scholars question whether countries with fewer violations are better at 
promoting accounting quality or if enforcement in these countries simply is inferior in 
detecting misstatements. Hellman (2011) builds on this research, coming to the 
conclusion that there are five important factors for a well-functioning enforcement 
system. First, he highlights the importance of consistent procedures across 
jurisdictions. Secondly, the competence of the workforce is vital, questioning the use 
of external consultants as it may undermine the capacity to retain competence. 
Further, he highlights the importance of legitimacy and independency, arguing that 
the structure where stock markets monitor their own clients could lead to a conflict of 
interest. Additionally, he argues that the threat of sanctions is a necessary part of the 
enforcement toolbox. The last factor target resources, which constitute a prerequisite 
for being able to carry out enforcement in a satisfactory manner, thus insufficient 
resources will cause implications in other areas.  
 
The use of proactive measures has also been discussed and especially the use of pre-
clearance. EFRAG has expressed concerns that pre-clearance poses a threat to 
uniform interpretation and encourage regulatory arbitrage as cross-listed issuers seek 
pre-clearance where available (Van Helleman, 2003).  Brown and Tarca (2005) find 
differences in how reviews are finished, where some enforcers issue publications with 
the name of the issuer, while others make publications anonymously. The approach to 
finish reviews by naming the issuer to the public is commonly referred to as  ‘Name 
                                                
8 As an example, Nasdaq OMX identified no errors for the year of 2007, while several countries had an 
error rate over 25%. In Ireland, 18 out of the 22 debt-issuers reviewed resulted in restatements (Berger, 
2010).  
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and Shame’. One advantage put forward in research is that it is an inexpensive 
alternative to sending cases to court. The counter argument is that it may cause 
unnecessary damage to the reputation of the issuer. (Brown and Tarca, 2005)  
 
Referring to the new Consultation Paper presented in section 2.1.7, the question 
whether enforcers should be “able to require all information relevant for their 
enforcement from issuers and auditors” has triggered reactions from the auditor 
profession. PwC expressed concerns regarding the possibilities to approach the 
auditor directly. In their view, management responsibility will be undermined if 
auditors would act on the request of the enforcers rather than the issuer (PwC, 2013).  
 
This discussion reveals the difficulties faced by both IASB and ESMA in shaping a 
consistent approach towards enforcement on national level. 
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3.	  Methodology	  
3.1	  A	  qualitative	  study	  	  	  
Jacobsen (2002) presents three characteristic features of qualitative research, which 
motivated us to conduct a qualitative study. Firstly, when the research area lacks 
similar studies, he argues that a qualitative approach is preferred. Enforcement is a 
common area of research, however, most of previous literature ignores to separate 
enforcement activities ‘on paper’ from actual practices, leaving a gap within the field 
of study. Daske et al. (2008) acknowledge this gap and suggest that future research 
should target country-level enforcement. Secondly, in order to acquire a more 
comprehensive and nuanced image of the research problem, a qualitative approach is 
superior to a quantitative. As this study endeavours to interpret and compare activities 
that these particular authorities are undertaking on a daily-basis, this factor is 
particularly relevant. Thirdly, the qualitative approach is more flexible in nature. 
Reflecting on the moderate initial understanding of the research problem and the lack 
of similar studies, allowing us to adapt the frame of reference when new ideas came 
to surface was essential. Given the purpose and research question presented in section 
1.2, combined with the discussion above, a qualitative study was in the end the only 
feasible method to ensure that unambiguously data was collected.  
3.2	  Research	  design	  
Enforcement has shown to be a cornerstone in promoting consistent application of 
IFRS, yet scholars have found considerable differences across jurisdictions (e.g 
Berger, 2010; Daske et al., 2008; Brown & Tarca, 2005). Nonetheless, there is a lack 
of research focusing on how these differences take their expression in actual 
procedures on national level. In order to close this gap we will undertake a qualitative 
descriptive study, identifying differences in actual practices on national level, with a 
primary research approach based on semi-structured interviews, with representatives 
from national enforcement bodies. Descriptive studies are best suited to answer 
questions formulated as what and how (De Vaus, 2001), which correspond well with 
the research question presented in section 1.2. Significant differences were then 
analysed by comparing empirical findings with prior literature. The research design 
has developed over time as the knowledge and understanding has increased 
throughout the process, however, some general stages can be distinguished. The 
initial phase consisted of a thorough review of related literature including, but not 
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limited to: Background IFRS-enforcement, principle-based enforcement and national 
structure of enforcement. In a second phase the primary data was collected, while the 
last phase involved a comparison between the empirical findings and the frame of 
reference. 
3.3	  The	  sample	  	  
In line with the qualitative approach and the aim to acquire a nuanced image, a 
relative small sample was required. We requested a total of thirteen interviews and 
subsequently concluded nine. Among the European enforcers connected to ESMA 
(Appendix 3), we requested interviews with enforcement bodies in: Germany, France, 
UK and the Netherlands. These countries were selected for several reasons. Firstly, 
these countries are among the most influential economies in Europe and are 
commonly referred to as the four most ‘vital’ economies in Europe (Mason, 1978). 
Secondly, these countries are also included in the sample of two similar studies 
(Berger, 2010; Brown & Tarca, 2005), enabling us to make relevant comparisons. The 
structure of enforcement also guided our selection; Belgium and Ireland were selected 
on the basis of the involvement from the Central Bank. Sweden and Denmark were 
chosen based on their two-tier structure, dividing enforcement between several 
authorities. As a result, we conducted several interviews in both Sweden (three) and 
Denmark (two), considering that internal variations could exist. Finland and Norway 
were selected due to their geographic proximity to Sweden. Thus, we derived a first 
sample consisting of: Germany, France, Netherlands, UK, Ireland, Belgium, Sweden, 
Norway, Finland and Denmark. Along the research process France, UK, Germany and 
Finland declined to participate. Thus, our final sample consists of a total of nine 
enforcement bodies distributed over six countries.  
Table 3.1. Sample. 
Country Enforcement Body 
Sweden Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (SFSA), Nasdaq OMX & 
Nordic Growth Market (NGM) 
Denmark Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (DFSA) & Danish Business 
Authority (DBA) 
Norway Financial Supervisory Authority Norway (FSAN) 
Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) 
Ireland  Irish Auditing & Accounting Supervisory Authority (IAASA) 
Belgium Financial Services & Markets Authority (FSMA) 
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In the process of finding respondents we focused primarily on practical insight and 
experience of how enforcement is carried out in practice. With the research question 
in mind, but also considering the frame of reference and secondary data, we derived 
the following criterions:  
• Practical insight on how enforcement is carried out in practice. 
• Up-to-date expertise in relation to the enforcement of IFRS. 
• Currently employed at the national enforcement body.  
• Experience from attending EECS.  
The process started with an abstract of the research, including the respondent 
criterions sent to each enforcement body, after which we got in contact with a 
respondent of their choosing. The number of respondents from each organization may 
differ due to differences in internal structures, as long as the respondent criterions 
were met the number of respondents were not a major concern. A brief description of 
respondents can be found in Appendix 4.  
3.4	  Data	  collection	  	  
The data collection process was undertaken using a five-stage approach, including 
both primary and secondary data. The process started with collection of background 
information, using secondary data from respective enforcement body’s homepage and 
publications from ESMA. In a second stage, the interview guide was developed from 
an overall assessment of the research question, related research and secondary data.  
Before coming to the final draft, the interview guide was tested in a pilot interview 
with a former employee at the SFSA9. The primary purpose of this interview was to 
assess both the quality and placement of the questions and after the interview we both 
added and excluded several questions. A revised interview guide was then derived 
with new insights collected during the pilot interview, as well as, feedback from our 
supervisors (Appendix 1). 
 
When the interview guide was established, the interview process began, consisting of 
nine semi-structured interviews during March 2014. All interviews were conducted 
via Skype, in the presence of both researcher and had duration of approximately 60 
minutes. The interviews were also recorded and complemented with notes from the 
                                                
9 The data obtained from the pilot-interview has not been included in the empirical findings. 
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researcher not conducting the interview 10 . When conducting interviews, the 
researchers always run the risk of leading the respondent to answer in the way most 
suitable for the research, Svenning (2003) refers to this as the interview effect. To 
mitigate the negative effects, the same questionnaire was used in all interviews. 
However, international respondents received questions in English, while Swedish-
speaking respondents received questions in Swedish11. With this approach we aimed 
to utilize all the benefits of conducting semi-structured interviews, enabling for 
respondents to talk more openly, hence, reduce interview effects. In a fourth stage, 
secondary data was compared to primary data, considering that interviews are 
subjective in nature, using this approach we could increase the validity and reliability 
of our findings (Yin, 2008; Silverman, 2006). In a final stage, a summary from each 
interview was sent back to each respondent to ensure that an accurate image had been 
documented. New ideas also emerged along the research process, which was dealt 
with in complementary email correspondence. 
3.5	  Analysis	  approach	  
In general the analysis of qualitative data focuses on making meaning out of the data 
(Merriam, 2009). Considering the research design, the analysis has been an on-going 
cycle between noticing, collecting and analysing data (Seidel, 1998).  
 
The noticing process can be separated into two levels where the first level refers to the 
actual observations, which have involved notes and tape-records from each interview. 
By consolidating notes from each interview, we created a record of things we had 
noticed (Seidel, 1998, p. 3). The record was then gone through several times, as 
interesting things were noticed they were given a code. An example of how the 
coding process was undertaken, is how we came to the labels formal and informal, 
presented in section 5.3 regarding ‘Contact’. Based on an overall assessment of how 
the respondent described the contact with the issuers they were given one of the 
above-mentioned codes. These codes enabled us to compile the information into 
manageable size in order to facilitate the subsequent phase; collecting12. As patterns 
of codes started to emerge we sorted the codes into different categories. A first 
categorization framework was, however, derived from related literature and used as a 
                                                
10 The researchers took turns in holding interviews.  
11 In addition to Swedish enforcers, interviews were conducted in Swedish with: FSAN and DBA.  
12 The term collecting is used interchangeably with sorting.  
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benchmark throughout the process13. These categories were then modified, categories 
and groups that seemed obvious at first later turned out to be less significant, we thus 
added and excluded several categories as the process went on. The final structure is 
thus a mix of how related literature has structured their findings and significant areas 
derived from the coding phase. Areas added by the researchers include, but are not 
limited to: contact, name and shame and resources. As the data was categorized we 
started to evaluate each category, looking for similarities and dissimilarities. Within 
each category, we identified relationships and patterns, which were then grouped 
accordingly. The structure applied in the analysis follows the main topics in the 
empirical chapter and was applied primarily due to the purpose of the study. Given 
that the aim of the study was to identify differences, it was essential to keep the focus 
on the empirical findings rather than prior literature. Furthermore, significant 
differences have been connected to prior research in order to give well-reasoned 
suggestions to improve the enforcement system in Europe. 
 
Even though the main objective has been to acquire an accurate image of the process 
as a whole, the analysis has been focusing on each activity individually. The frame of 
reference has been used as a benchmark for the analysis presented in chapter six. In 
practice this has entailed that interpretations and analytic insights have been endorsed 
through prior literature. However, the connection between the frame of reference and 
empirical findings did not have a clear point of departure. Theory has influenced the 
data collection, while the empirical data similarly has induced us to find new 
theoretical areas; this interplay is commonly referred to as the abductive approach 
(Dubois and Gadde, 2002).  
 
In sum, the process of analysing data has been an iterative and reflexive process, it 
cannot be said to have a clear starting point, neither a certain point in time where the 
analysis has ceased (Stake, 1995). Lastly, given that the researchers have taken an 
active role in the process, the data has been under constant interpretation as feelings 
and reflections inevitably have been incorporated before the data has been presented. 
 
 
                                                
13 The article by Berger (2010) has been a great inspiration for the structure applied in Chapter 5. 
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4.	  Empirical	  Background	  	  
In accordance with the Transparency Directive (2004) each member state should 
designate a national competent authority, responsible for enforcement on national 
level. The competent authority can delegate this task to another unit, referred to as a 
delegated authority (Transparency Directive, 2004/EC/109).  
4.1	  Sweden	  
The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (SFSA - Swedish: Finansinspektionen) 
is the independent public regulatory agency responsible for supervision of financial 
markets and its participants. The Ministry of Finance is the government organ under 
which the SFSA regulate all companies that provide financial services in Sweden. 
Since 2007, IFRS-enforcement is delegated to the two regulated marketplaces, 
namely: Nasdaq OMX (OMX) and Nordic Growth Market (NGM). The unique two-
tier structure derives primarily from the provisions contained in the Securities and 
Market Act (2007:528) and the SFSA regulations (FFFS 2007:17)14. Thus, the 
regulated marketplaces are not delegated units within SFSA, they have been entrusted 
with supervision by law and thus have no governmental authority. 
 
The responsibilities in regard to IFRS-enforcement can be separated between the 
authorities as follows: The SFSA shall supervise companies, which have Sweden as 
home member state but have their securities traded on another stock exchange within 
the European Economic Area (EEA). The SFSA is also responsible for coordinating 
enforcement within Sweden, as well as supervising the tasks delegated to OMX and 
NGM. In contrast, OMX and NGM supervise companies that have Sweden as home 
member state and listed on respective stock exchange. In addition they shall also 
assist the SFSA in the European cooperation.  
4.2	  Denmark	  	  
In Denmark, enforcement of IFRS is divided between two authorities, the Danish 
Financial Supervisory Authority (DFSA - Danish: Finanstilsynet) and the Danish 
Business Authority (DBA - Danish: Erhvervsstyrelsen). DFSA is responsible for 
periodic financial information in financial companies, while the DBA carries out the 
same task for non-financial companies. Both authorities are part of the Ministry of 
Business and Growth and carry out the secretariat function under the Financial 
                                                
14 Essentially based on the CESR Standards.  
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Council, however, make decisions in their own name. The Financial Council act as 
the board for both DFSA and DBA, their mission is to “make decisions in matters of a 
principle nature or of far-reaching significance” (Finanstilsynet.dk). Both DFSA and 
DBA have extensive areas of responsibility, where auditor supervision also lies with 
these authorities. The DFSA monitors auditor-related provision in financial 
companies, while the DBA performs the same task for non-financial companies. The 
DFSA is also responsible for prospectuses and preparation of Danish GAAP. In 
respect to the European cooperation, DFSA and DBA act as a single unit.   
4.3	  Norway	  
The competent authority is the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (FSAN - 
Norwegian: Finanstilsynet), which is an independent government agency reporting to 
the Ministry of Finance. The financial stability in Norway is based upon a three-pillar 
system, where the Ministry of finance is at the top of the organization with ultimate 
responsibility for financial stability and regulation. At the next level, the Central Bank 
is in charge of executing monetary policy. At the third level, FSAN performs 
supervision of individual issuers and supports the preparation of regulation (i.e local 
GAAP). In respect to IFRS-enforcement, FSAN is responsible for compliance of 
listed companies and also represents Norway in the European cooperation (Moss, 
2010). 
4.4	  The	  Netherlands	  
Since 2002, enforcement is divided between the Authority for the Financial Markets 
(AFM) and the Central Bank. The AFM is responsible for the enforcement of IFRS, 
while the central bank is responsible for prudential supervision. The responsibilities 
of AFM are extensive and include: Financial services, capital markets and stability of 
the financial system. The authority is further structured into five sectors and the unit 
responsible for enforcement of IFRS is ‘Audit & Reporting Quality’. The supervisory 
board has the objective to ensure that AFM performs its tasks in accordance with 
good governance and is appointed by the Ministry of Finance. In sum, AFM is the 
competent authority and the only enforcer to partake in the European cooperation 
regarding enforcement of IFRS. 
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4.5	  Ireland	  
The Central Bank of Ireland is the competent authority and central administrative 
authority according to the Transparency Directive (2004), while the Irish Auditing 
and Accounting Supervisory Authority (IAASA) is a separate designated independent 
competent authority for accounting enforcement, hence the authority responsible for 
IFRS-enforcement. The responsibilities of the IAASA are divided into periodic 
financial reporting and financial information in prospectuses, where IAASA is in 
charge of the former and the Central Bank of the latter. The result of this structure is 
that the Central Bank is member of ESMA, while IAASA is ‘only’ an active member 
of EECS. IAASA is also a member of the EECS Agenda Group, which entails further 
responsibilities in deciding which emerging issues and decisions to discuss in plenary. 
The main task is examining financial statements, while other responsibilities include 
the development of local GAAP. 
4.6	  Belgium	  
Since 1 of April 2011, the financial supervision in Belgium is divided between the 
National Bank and the Financial Services and Markets Authority (FSMA). The 
National Bank of Belgium is responsible for prudential supervision and the FSMA for 
financial market supervision and consumer protection. FSMA is an autonomous 
public institution established by law to carry out the activities entrusted to them by 
parliament. The structure of FSMA is hierarchical in nature, where the ‘Supervisory 
Board’ oversees the operations and financing, the ‘Management Committee’ is the 
organ that takes all the formal decisions and consists of managers from each division 
(FSMA, n.d). The division ‘Supervision of financial markets and listed companies’ is 
the unit in charge of IFRS-enforcement. In the international context, FSMA is a 
member of ESMA and the only authority from Belgium to attend EECS meetings.  
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5.	  Empirical	  Findings	  
In this chapter we present our empirical findings out of the nine interviews with 
respondents at six national enforcement bodies, as well as secondary data gathered 
from homepages.  
5.1	  Resources	  
CESR Standard No.1, Principle 6 states that the competent administrative authority 
shall have access to sufficient resources, yet there is no definition of what 
‘sufficiently resourced’ entails. Given the embedded subjectivity, resources allocation 
has proven difficult to map. All respondents were, however, asked whether they 
believed their unit has access to enough resources. Ireland was the only country to 
admit being under-resourced. Mr Kavanagh at the IAASA states that his unit will 
need another five employees, adding to the current three, in order to perform the tasks 
in a satisfactory manner. The availability of resources may also be reflected in the 
time spent per examination. Due to significant variations in both size and complexity 
of full examinations, the ‘initial review’ was used as a proxy to assess the availability 
of resources15. The time spent on the initial review ranged from five up to a hundred 
hours (!). Some enforcers used a minimum of forty hours, while others spent a 
maximum of fifteen hours. On account of granted anonymity there will be no further 
reference to specific enforcement body. 
 
As mentioned above, ESMA does not provide a definition of ‘sufficiently resourced’, 
thus assessing the reliability of the data obtained in the first questions is for obvious 
reasons problematic. It is, however, interesting to note that all authorities involved in 
enforcement within Sweden consider the amount of resources as sufficient. 
Nonetheless, resource allocation was one factor put forward as a reason to abandon 
the current structure in a memorandum to the Ministry of Finance in 2009 
(Finansinspektionen, 2009).  
                                                
15 The ‘initial review’ refers to activities before making further contact with the issuer, i.e review the 
financial statements. 
  30 
5.2	  Legal	  authority	  	  
As stated in the frame of reference and foremost in 2.2.1, enforcement is embedded in 
the word legality, thus the legal authority is of uttermost importance to the underlying 
purpose of enforcement. 
 
External services 
Based on the extent that external services are engaged in the enforcement process, 
enforcers can be separated into two groups; one group that use external consultants on 
a regular basis (Ireland, Norway, OMX and NGM). The second group consists of 
enforcers, which only make use of external services in specific cases (Denmark, 
Belgium, SFSA and the Netherlands).  
 
Ireland, Norway, OMX and NGM have external consultants conduct the initial 
review, in practice this entails that an external firm prepare cases while the 
enforcement unit investigates and prosecutes the case in contact with the issuer. In 
addition, OMX and FSAN have the ability to seek advice from an ‘expert panel’. The 
arguments behind the use of external consultants differ between these jurisdictions, 
Norway welcomes the possibility to engage external expertise as it may facilitate the 
decision-making process and enhance the quality. In Sweden, the limited number of 
IFRS specialists has compelled the enforcers to seek external expertise. In Ireland the 
use of external consultants is primarily due to insufficient resources. The second 
group of enforcers (Denmark, Belgium, SFSA and the Netherlands) normally possess 
all expertise in-house and seldom use external services.  
 
Access to auditors’ working papers: 
In general, issuers are obliged to disclose information on request from the enforcer 
and the formal correspondence is thus with the issuers. Some enforcers also have 
authority to request information directly from the auditor, even if it implies reviewing 
their working papers. The right to review auditors’ working papers is available in: 
Sweden (SFSA), Ireland and Belgium. Given the unique structure in Sweden, SFSA 
has been entrusted with certain remits by law16, while OMX and NGM only have a 
contractual relationship with the issuers, hence only can request information provided 
by the issuer.   
 
                                                
16 Securities Market Act 23:3 
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Pre-clearance 
As mentioned in section 2.1.6, pre-clearance refers to the situation when issuers 
approach the enforcer in preparation of the financial statements, seeking approval on a 
specific accounting treatment. The ability to provide pre-clearance is available in 
Denmark and Belgium. In Denmark, the process of providing pre-clearance can be 
both formal and informal. The formal process requires comprehensive information 
about the specific case and is not widely used (1-2 cases a year). Informal pre-
clearance is normally dealt with over the phone and refers to less complex cases. In 
Belgium pre-clearance can also be obtained under strict conditions, it requires a 
formal statement from the auditor.  
 
Norway, Ireland and the Netherlands do not engage in any form of pre-clearance. In 
Sweden, the ability to provide pre-clearance is also restricted, however, Mr Ramström 
at NGM implies that informal discussion sometimes occur without falling under the 
label pre-clearance.  
5.3	  Examination	  approach	  
Examining the methods and techniques to approach each individual review is an 
accurate way to distinguish the enforcers from each other.   
 
Selection methods 
As mentioned in 2.1.3, the member states have the opportunity to use different 
methods of selecting firms for review. Sweden, Norway, Belgium and the 
Netherlands use a mix of risk and rotation. In Sweden this implies a formal rotation 
cycle of five years. Norway and the Netherlands do not have a formal rotation cycle, 
but aim to review companies every 5-6 years. Belgium use a rotation cycle but due to 
confidentiality this information could not be disclosed. 
 
Denmark and Ireland use selection methods without taking a specific rotation cycle in 
consideration. Ireland bases their selection on an overall assessment of risk, taking 
certain areas into consideration. These include, but are not limited to: financial 
structure, industry specific issues and audit qualifications. Denmark uses a 
combination of risk- and random sampling. According to Ms Heerup at the DFSA, the 
random sample is constructed in a way that all companies should get reviewed in a 
certain timeframe (not specified). In practice, their entails maximum of 20% of all 
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issuers each year, all high-risk firms are selected and if the ratio is not filled, 
additional issuers are selected based on random sampling. In the sample for the year 
of 2012, 68% of the companies were determined according to risk, while 32% were 
randomly selected (Finanstilsynet, 2013). 
 
Review process 
The suggested enforcement process presented by ESMA in section 2.1.6 is broadly 
applicable to how enforcers carry out their activities. Common for all enforcers is that 
the financial statement is the main working document, where the majority of reviews 
take its starting point. Some enforcers also have access to additional documentation, 
not necessarily provided by the issuer. This may entail looking at what is 
internationally known as the long-form audit report or other, national specific reports. 
In Belgium, the review is initiated by requesting an auditor report where the main 
areas of risk are described. In Ireland, the enforcer has access to summary report with 
preliminary announcements ahead of the publication of the full report. This report is 
used as a supplementary source of information in the overall assessment of risk. The 
DFSA makes use of having other areas of responsibility, tips from colleagues within 
the authority is not an uncommon way to initiate a review. In the Netherlands the 
review process is subjected to legal limitations. The system is built to remove doubt, 
which can only arise from publicly available information. Thus, further information 
regarding specific treatments can only be obtained if doubt has been documented.  
 
Based on the available information, enforcers tend to emphasize different focus (i.e 
disclosures, measurement or recognition). Common for Sweden is the ambition to get 
away from disclosure formalities and focus more on measurement, yet Mr Jacobsson 
at the SFSA admits that some general checklists are utilized. The focus among the 
Danish enforcers goes apart; the DFSA tends to focus on disclosure, while the DBA 
argues that measurement is more important. Norway has a distinct focus on both 
measurement and recognition, Ms Svae the FSAN confirms this by stating: “in 
relation to other enforcers, I would say we focus more on measurement and 
recognition rather than disclosure”.  
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Contact 
Throughout the review process, the contact with issuers can be divided into two 
phases. The first is when it is brought to the attention of the issuer that he is under 
review. The second phase is the contact necessary when enforcers identify 
misstatements. All enforcers use the same correspondence in the first contact, while 
the correspondence in the second phase differs. We categorize the enforcers into two 
groups: formal and informal according to an overall assessment of the contact with 
the issuer. The informal approach implies contact by email and phone, where the 
companies may discuss issues in an informal manner (Sweden, DFSA and the 
Netherlands). The formal correspondence, on the other hand, primarily implies 
written letters back and forth (DBA, Norway, Belgium and Ireland). Enforcers 
labelled as formal have a stricter attitude against the issuers, which is confirmed by 
Mr Nilsen at the DBA: “The communication with the issuers is something that differs 
a lot between enforcers. UK for instance is more polite than us, we have a more direct 
tone”. 
 
Time-limits 
The only country in our sample using a strict time limit is the Netherlands, where a 
review should be finished within six months after the financial statements are 
published. Even though the other enforcers lack a formal time limit, they still aim to 
finish the reviews before the next annual financial statements are issued. They argue, 
that the issuance of the next financial statement act as an informal time limit. Given 
the speed of which the market demands information, it is pointless conducting 
reviews after the fiscal year has ended.   
 
Issuance of alerts indicating the main areas of examination 
Relating to the definition of enforcement applied in this paper, enforcement is 
primarily an ex-post activity. Some enforcers also seek to encourage compliance by 
engaging in ex-ante activities. These activities can either take the shape of revealing 
upcoming focus areas or other publications, which enable issuers to consider these 
when preparing upcoming financial statements. OMX, NGM, Denmark, Belgium, 
Norway and the Netherlands, reveal upcoming focus areas in a systematic way, while 
the SFSA and IAASA do not engage in these activities to the same extent. FSMA and 
DFSA also provide more detailed guidance, the FSMA has published a study on IAS 
19 and the DFSA has published papers on both materiality and measurement of loans.  
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5.4	  Result	  of	  examination	  
According to Principle 21, Standard No. 1 enforcers shall periodically report to the 
public on their activities. Yet, it has been proven difficult to provide an accurate 
overview of the results from each jurisdiction. 
● Ireland: Out of the 142 issuers falling under the responsibility of the IAASA in 
2012, 31 examinations of periodic financial information were conducted. 24 
examinations resulted in further correspondence with the issuers, 22 provided 
undertakings in respect of future periodic financial reports and one issuer 
voluntarily agreed to issue a revised report. 
●  Sweden: 
○ SFSA: No data gathered.  
○ OMX: In total 94 issuers were reviewed for the year of 201317. Out of 
which 37 were full-scope reviews and 57 partial-reviews. One 
company was de-listed, five issuers received ‘criticism’ and 14 
received a ‘comment’18. 
○ NGM: In the sample for 2013, three issuers were selected for full-
scope reviews (20%). In addition, interim reports for all issuers are 
review continuously. In eight cases the examination was finished with 
a ‘comment’ and in one case with a ‘remark’.19 
● Norway: FSAN conducted full-scope reviews of 50 issuers. In addition, audit 
reports were reviewed for all listed companies. Eight cases were given closer 
attention. 
● Denmark: In total 34 cases were concluded for the year of 2012, while 12 
unfinished cases were transferred to the upcoming year. Out of the 19 reports 
processed20, eight misstatements and one infringement were reported. Four 
issuers were ordered to publish corrective information and two issuers chose 
to publish this information by themselves before presenting the case in front of 
the council.  
● Belgium & Netherlands: Detailed statistics is not made publicly available.  
 
                                                
17 36 based on rotation, 14 based on risk, 6 newly listed companies (‘one-year-follow-up’), 28 follow-
ups from previous years and 10 non-finished reviews from last year. 
18 See Appendix 5 for definitions of ‘criticism’ and ‘comment’ 
19 See Appendix 5 for definitions of ‘comment’ and ‘remark’.  
20 If several matters are identified in the same report, only the misstatement is recognized and 
disclosed. 
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This overview might help explain the difficulties faced when presenting activities 
undertaken by national enforcers.  
 
Actions  
Deciding which actions to use in case of a misstatement is ultimately a national affair. 
Although actions are taken on national level CESR Standard No. 1 outlines possible 
actions and states that national enforcers should ‘take appropriate action’21. Sweden, 
Norway, Ireland and the Netherlands have a tendency to prefer ‘correction in future 
financial statement’. The national law in the Netherlands is set up to reach informal 
agreements and since 2012, AFM has preferred to issue a letter of reminder contrary 
to formal direction. As a result, the number of issues declined from 64 in 2011 to 16 
in 2012 (AFM, 2013). Similarly, Ireland promotes informal procedures rather than 
formal instructions. In contrast, both Denmark and Belgium have implemented a more 
formal policy where material misstatements should be corrected in a timely manner. 
Investor focus seems to be the common denominator for these enforcers, if investors 
need to be informed the action should not be postponed. In other words, these 
jurisdictions make use of the ‘public corrective notes’ to a larger extent than other 
enforcers in our sample. Principle 16 also states that non-material departures may also 
justify an action. Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands use a formal terminology for 
‘levels of non-compliance’. In practice this entails additional actions tied to non-
material misstatement, in place to enhance the quality of the financial statement, 
rather than enforce material misstatements. In Appendix 5 we will give 
comprehensive presentation of the ‘levels of non-compliance’ in respective 
jurisdiction.  
 
‘Name and shame’ 
When a review is finished with a public corrective note, there is an option to name the 
issuer (i.e ‘Name and shame’). This approach is available in Denmark, Norway, 
Ireland and Belgium. One argument put forward by enforcers in these countries is that 
the idea is to inform the investors and without name it would not have an effect. 
Sweden and the Netherlands, on the other hand, normally use publications without 
naming the issuer.22 It is worth mentioning that most actions do not necessarily 
                                                
21 See Section 2.1.6 
22 Although Sweden and Netherlands are labelled as ‘No’, publications with name sometimes occur. As 
an example, in Sweden, all disciplinary cases are published with the name of the issuer. 
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demand this ‘action’, for instance cases finished with the action ‘correction in the next 
financial statement’. 
5.5	  Sanctions	  
“Actions taken by the enforcers should be distinguished from sanctions imposed by 
the national legislation” (CESR Standard No. 1, Principle 17). Actions are activities 
from the enforcer to get the issuer to provide accurate information to the market, 
while sanctions refer to what the enforcer can do if the issuers refuse to cooperate.  
 
Due to differences in national legislation, enforcers have different forms of sanctions 
at their disposal. The formal decision to impose a sanction is often passed forward to 
another body to make the final decision, which can either be within the enforcement 
body or a judicial authority outside the organization.23  
The two most common types of sanctions are to impose a fine or to remove the listed 
stock from the exchange where it is traded (i.e de-list). Ireland, Norway, SFSA and 
the Netherlands do not posses the power to de-list their issuers. The reasons for this 
differ, Ireland for instance is not a securities regulator and SFSA is in charge for 
issuers listed on stock exchanges outside Sweden, restricting their authority in the 
matter.  When it comes to fines, AFM is the only enforcer not having this ability. All 
respondents answered in a similar manner and stated that sanctions are rarely used. 
5.6	  European	  cooperation	  	  
Throughout the interview process, all enforcers’ have underlined the importance of 
the EECS for uniform interpretation. A common view is that the cooperation has 
improved steadily in the last couple of years and that we are getting closer to a 
harmonized environment. Nonetheless, we have identified two areas of significance 
that will be presented in this section.  
Firstly, frequency of cases submitted to the database and secondly, the role of the 
accumulated database (EECS-database). For obvious reasons, the frequency of cases 
submitted to the database correlate with the number of misstatements. Regardless of 
this, it is interesting to note that some enforcers have implemented a routine where the 
majority of decision shall be submitted (Denmark, Ireland and Belgium), while others 
seem to apply a more restrictive policy (Sweden, Netherlands, Norway). Due to the 
                                                
23 We focus on the possibility for enforcers to influence these processes, hence make no distinction 
which unit that is ultimately responsible for issuing the actual sanction. 
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moderate number of issuers and relative size, NGM are limited in the sense that the 
majority of cases do not reach ‘accounting merit’. The DBA, on the other hand, send 
all cases that are not considered trivial.   
 
As mentioned in 2.1.5, the EECS have a connected database where all discussed cases 
are uploaded for the members to seek guidance. The database is one of the most 
important tools in the European harmonization process. In general all enforcers find 
the database useful and an important feature in the process towards harmonization, 
however, the database is not applied consistently across the member states. In Ireland 
and Denmark the database is formally built into respective regime, requiring 
employees to consult the database before taking formal decisions. Belgium, 
Netherlands and Norway used the database as a basis for internal discussions, where 
cases are presented and discussed internally after each EECS meeting. Swedish 
enforcers do not neglect the ability to use the database, however apply it more 
restrictively than other enforcers. A common view presented by the latter two groups 
is that the database is helpful when similar cases are found, but they do not find it 
necessary to consult the database in each individual case.  
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5.7	  Summary	  of	  differences	  
In Table 5.1 we provide a complied version of differences in tabular form. Some areas 
have been excluded due to difficulties in tabulating the findings.  
	  
 
                                                
24 The number of employees is based on interview material, thus it might not correlate with the ‘Full 
Time Equivalent’ (FTE) in relation to IFRS enforcement. Additionally the number of employees does 
not include external consultants.    
25 In this context ‘Yes’ indicate enforcers that use external services to conduct the initial review. 
 SWEDEN DENMARK NORWAY NETHERLANDS IRELAND BELGIUM 
Enforcement 
Body 
SFSA  OMX  NGM  DBA DFSA FSAN AFM IAASA FSMA 
Employees24 3 2  3 5 12 8 12 3 15 
Number of 
issuers 
10  253 15 154 23 240 250 142 120 
Legal 
Authority 
         
External 
services25 
No Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes No 
Auditor 
working 
papers’ 
Yes No No  No No No No Yes  Yes 
Pre-clearance No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Examination 
Approach 
         
Selection 
methods 
Risk & 
rotation 
Risk & 
rotation 
Risk & 
rotation 
Risk & 
random 
Risk & 
random 
Risk & 
rotation 
Risk & rotation Primary 
risk 
Risk & 
rotation 
Contact Informal Informal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Formal 
Time-limit No No No No No No Yes  No No 
Issuance of 
alerts  
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Result of 
Examination 
 
 
‘Name & 
shame’ 
No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Levy fine Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
De-list No Yes Yes Yes Yes No  No No Yes 
Table 5.1. Summary of differences 
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6.	  Analysis	  	  
When mapping differences in how the enforcement bodies carry out their activities, 
one finds that it differs in several areas. In this chapter we present seven areas, which 
we argue are the significant differences. These are analysed in regard to prior research 
presented in the frame of reference. 
6.1	  Structures	  
Relying on Hellman’s (2011) factors of a well-functioning enforcement system, 
independency and legitimacy are two important features to consider when structuring 
enforcement. In respect to these factors, we find a potential risk in two countries: 
Sweden and Ireland. In Sweden our concerns are based on two factors. First, the 
structure where the two stock exchanges monitor their own clients is inevitably faced 
with independency and legitimacy dilemmas. Second, OMX and NGM have declared 
not willing to continue with the tasks entrusted to them (Finansinspektionen, 2009). 
The discontent is a product of several inherent weaknesses, where disparities within 
the internal market, difficulties to retain competence and insufficient resource 
allocation were put forward as arguments to abandon the current structure. In line 
with Hellman (2011), we are of the view that conflict of interest dilemmas of this kind 
may well limit their ability to carry out enforcement. In Ireland, our concerns derive 
from the fact that the Central Bank is a member of ESMA, while the IAASA ‘only’ is 
a member of EECS. We argue that this structure may well create independency 
dilemmas and impair their ability to affect EU-level decisions on the matter of 
enforcement.  
 
Even though we find differences in how enforcement is structured, the alternative put 
forward in the literature also exhibits weaknesses. According to Leuz (2010), a 
solution would be to create a supra-national enforcement body to carry out 
enforcement across jurisdictions. We argue that the problem with this approach lies in 
how Leuz suggests it to be funded. When relying on membership fees, the system will 
give rise to the same interdependency and legitimacy dilemmas as currently 
experienced in Sweden. The supra-national body will oversee the activities of their 
own clients, given them no incentives to be as strong as theoretical desirable.  
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To conclude, considering that ESMA has 29 members and the fact that European 
authority on the matter is limited, our findings are not surprising. We, however, 
acknowledge a risk that structural differences might give rise to implications in other 
areas of the enforcement process, which will be discussed in subsequent sections.  
6.2	  Resources	  	  
Even though our study does not provide a comprehensive analysis of how resources 
differ across jurisdictions, it is still evident that both time and effort differ 
considerably. The strength of enforcement is usually evaluated in terms of resources 
(e.g Jackson and Roe, 2009) and given that scholars ascribe a lot of explanatory value 
to the strength of enforcement (e.g Pope and McLeay, 2011; Hope, 2003), it is 
alarming to conclude that resources differ to such an extent. ESMA does not possess 
economic muscles to support enforcement in each jurisdiction, however, the authority 
to set minimum requirements. Given the potential consequences of under-resourced 
enforcers presented by Hellman (2011), we strongly support more guidance on the 
subject of resources.  
 
Furthermore, principles-based enforcement has shown to be more expensive than 
rules-based enforcement (Park, 2012). Consequently, enforcers that are subjected to 
resource limitations will not put in the time and efforts needed to make accurate 
judgment in specific cases. Referring to the definition of principles-based 
enforcement, judgment is a fundamental part, why we recognize a danger that 
insufficiently resourced enforcers’ may, in the long run, transform into rules-based 
enforcers. 
 
Relating to the discussion in the previous section, we argue that the structural issues 
in Sweden may cause negative spillovers, affecting their ability to allocate resources. 
When the cost of enforcement is passed on to the issuers and the issuer is your own 
client, the incentives to charge a fair amount is lowered. Furthermore, from an 
economic perspective, it is not optimal to divide enforcement between three different 
authorities. To this end and in line with Carvajal and Elliott (2009), we argue that 
enforcers need to strengthen their capacity, acknowledging that ESMA should 
consider implementing a definition of ‘sufficiently resourced’ in order to overcome 
challenges ahead. 
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6.3	  Legal	  authority	  	  
Relating to the empirical findings presented in Section 5.2, we find that the use of 
external services can be described as a two-sided coin. On the one side, and in line 
with Hellman (2011), we find that enforcers, which make use of external services on a 
regular basis, may experience difficulties retaining competence. On the other side, 
enforcers that engage external expertise in ‘specific cases’ may enhance the quality of 
enforcement without experiencing difficulties retaining competence. Embracing a 
wider perspective, the use of external consultants may as well give rise to 
implications on European level. As external consultants are not allowed to attend 
EECS or access the database, the underlying purpose of sharing experiences may be 
hampered. However, keeping in mind the reasons why enforcers engage external 
consultants, it is obvious that the alternative is not superior (i.e prohibiting this 
ability). Much of the problems tied to external consultants have their roots in other 
areas, such as structural issues or insufficient resources. Acknowledging that the use 
of external consultants cannot be viewed independently, we argue that ESMA should 
focus on other areas of improvement.   
 
Moreover, the legal authority to access auditors’ working papers is only available to a 
few enforcers. Even though none of which expressed that this ability is used regularly, 
it still may impact the overall enforcement process. Acknowledging that enforcement 
does not only involve activities per se, as part of the legal system, enforcement of 
financial reporting also relies on deterrence (e.g Downs, 1997; Becker, 1968). To this 
end, we argue that the possibility to request auditors’ working papers should be made 
available to all enforcers. 
 
Referring to the definition of enforcement used in this paper, the question arises 
whether pre-clearance fall under the responsibility of the enforcers or not. The debate 
throughout the interview process testifies that the views go apart. Mr Jacobsson at the 
SFSA is of the view that “it is not up to us to be the consultants”, while Danish 
enforcers welcome the possibility to proactively enhance the quality of the financial 
statement. Van Helleman (2003) argues that pre-clearance is on the borderline to 
interpretation and, in the long run, may give rise to regulatory arbitrage. In contrast to 
Van Helleman (2003), we argue that pre-clearance does not poses a threat to uniform 
interpretation or a factor that triggers regulatory arbitrage. We base this argument on 
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two factors, firstly, pre-clearance is rarely provided and secondly, in practice, the 
assessment of pre-clearance does not differ from normal enforcement procedures.  
 
Applying a wider perspective to the discussion, it is evident that enforcement also 
stretches beyond actual practices, it is as much a matter of legal authority, whether the 
authority is imposed or not. Mr Kavanagh at the IAASA also recognizes this: “the 
threat of using our statutory powers is still there and that is probably why the issuer 
correct voluntarily”.  
6.4	  Examination	  approach 
Relating to the empirical findings regarding selection methods, we recognize a 
potential risk among those enforcers not using a rotation cycle. When sampling solely 
by risk and random, some issuers might never get reviewed. In line with Ball (2001), 
we believe that issuers might consider to cross-list in the environment most suitable to 
their needs. ESMA also acknowledges this loophole and in the new consultation 
paper, a mixed approach will be the only acceptable selection method.  
 
Considering that the Netherlands is the only country with a formal time limit, make us 
question the actual requirements for efficiency among the European enforcers. In line 
with Becker (2011), we argue that enforcement needs to be carried out with celerity. 
If the information was to reach the market too late, the relative effect of more severe 
actions (i.e public corrective note and restatement) will be undermined. We find that 
the lack of formal time limits might correlate with the overrepresentation of the action 
‘correction in future financial statements’.  
 
Moreover, we find that the information available to enforcers differs significantly, 
which we argue could be another reason to differences in ‘error rate’. As an example, 
given that only publicly available information is reviewed in the Netherlands; 
management judgement is to a large extent not tested against that of the enforcer. 
Measurement is for the greater part based on management judgement, thus, the lack of 
information is hampering their ability to make accurate assessments of risk. In other 
words, being limited to certain information also limits enforcers’ ability to encounter 
misstatements. With this in mind and in contrast to PwC (2013), we argue that 
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enforcers should be able to request all information necessary, even if it implies going 
directly to the auditor. 
 
In line with Becker (2011) we find that enforcers engage in proactive activities to a 
large extent. When considering the purpose of issuance of alerts and guidance, we 
argue that the extent to which enforcers engage in proactive activities may distort the 
possibility to compare enforcers by ‘error rate’. To this end, we question prior 
research using ‘error rate’ to evaluate the effectiveness without taking proactive 
activities in consideration (e.g Brown and Tarca, 2005; Berger, 2010).  
6.5	  Result	  of	  examination	  
According to Hitz et al. (2012), the strength of enforcement can be measured in terms 
of severity of actions. In this context, Denmark and Belgium would be the only 
countries labelled as ‘strong’, given that they make use of ‘public corrective notes’ to 
a larger extent. However, as pointed out by several enforcers’, informal solutions are 
often preferred, rather than formal direction. As a consequence the number of issues 
reported may not provide an accurate measure, as informal solutions are not captured 
by these statistics. In line with Scholz (1994), it can be argued that these enforcers 
have implemented a more educative approach, not necessarily implying ‘weaker’ 
enforcement.  
 
When considering Brown and Tarca’s (2005) argument for the use of ‘Name and 
Shame’, we expected to find a relation to under-resourced enforcers. This showed not 
to be the case; instead we found that the enforcers’ using ‘Name and Shame’ also use 
a formal correspondence and are less lenient towards the use of actions.  
 
The large number of discrepancies related to the outcome of the enforcement process, 
begs the questions whether ‘strict enforcement’26 should be considered as positive or 
negative. The argument in favour of strict enforcement is built around sending a 
credible signal to investor and show reliability (Ball, 2001). The counter argument is 
that it could cause uncertainty among investors (Berger, 2010). Considering the 
research design applied in this paper, we are unfit to comment on which of these 
arguments that are valid. Nevertheless, we argue that country differences, irrespective 
                                                
26 In this paper we refer to strict enforcement as being less lenient towards the use of actions. 
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of their nature are alarming enough to be concern. In accordance with Ball (2001), we 
see a potential risk of ‘regulatory arbitrage’ as issuers seek to list in the environment 
most suitable to their needs.  
6.6	  Sanctions	  
Relying on Braithwaite’s (1985) theory on how to use sanctions, we note that all 
enforcers can be defined accordingly, where deterrence is built on the existence of 
sanctions rather than the use. These findings also correspond well with Becker’s 
(2011) characteristics of a deterrence system, where communication and proactive 
measure have developed as substitutes for sanctions.  
 
Relating to the empirical findings, sanctions are seldom imposed among the enforcers 
and we find several potential reasons for this. Firstly, we note that findings regarding 
sanctions correlate with results in other areas. For instance examination approach 
shows that the majority of enforcers tend to apply the educative approach presented 
by Scholz (1994), where deterrence is a matter of communication rather than 
sanctions. Another potential explanation is that actions are enough to foster 
compliance, which is also recognized by several respondents.  
 
To conclude, even though the availability of sanctions differs across jurisdiction, we 
find that they are used in a similar manner. We argue that the lack of sanctions is not a 
major concern as we provide evidence that other activities have developed as 
substitutes.  
6.7	  European	  cooperation	  	  
As pointed out in the empirical findings, the European cooperation has improved 
steadily and the majority of enforcers believe we are approaching a harmonized 
environment. We, however, argue that the transition towards a ‘full-European view’ is 
far from risk-free.  
 
In accordance with Ball (2009) we acknowledge the risk that IFRS-enforcement will 
struggle to stay principles-based. In the pragmatic world of today, it may be tempting 
to develop systems to replicate previous decisions, which in turn would convert 
principles into rules. This discussion could easily be applied on the database of the 
EECS, which purpose is to provide guidance in complex decisions. Considering that 
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the database is applied inconsistently across jurisdictions and if used for the ‘wrong 
reasons’, we believe that a principles-based system like IFRS runs the risk of 
transforming into a rules-based system. In line with Park (2012), we also 
acknowledge that principles-based enforcement is tied to more controversy, as it is 
more difficult to predict the outcome. We see a potential risk that enforcers may use 
the database to lower the controversy by replicating previous decisions. If we are to 
reach consistent enforcement, ESMA might need to consider implementing a formal 
process how the database should be applied. This may also be called for in order to 
stay principles-based. 
 
Furthermore, as outlined in the empirical findings, the benchmark applied to send 
cases to the database differs significantly. A quantitative measure like frequency 
might not entail implications in the short term, however, we recognize a danger in the 
long term. In principle, our concerns are based on the threat of allowing more 
interpretational power to a few enforcers, rather than striving for a ‘full-European 
view’. In other words, assuming that the database consist of a majority of decisions 
from a few countries, their influence on how enforcement is interpreted will 
inevitably be greater. In the long term, this might lead to a situation where the most 
active enforces becomes the role model for European enforcers without necessarily 
applying the best practice. 
 
To conclude, even though the European cooperation has improved steadily, we are far 
from reaching a ‘full-European view’. Relating to the discussion above, we 
acknowledge a potential trade-off between, on the one hand, harmonization and on 
the other, a principles-based system. 
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7.	  Concluding	  Remarks	  
This chapter presents the conclusion of the empirical findings and the following 
analysis with regard to the purpose of the study.  Further, potential limitations will be 
disused in order to provide useful insights on future research areas.  
7.1	  Conclusion	  
The introduction of IFRS was set out to be a turning point in European accounting 
harmonization. Yet, there still exist questions whether IFRS is applied consistently 
across the union, much due to differences in how the standards are enforced. Prior 
research has shown that enforcement is not carried out consistently across countries, 
while the purpose of this study was to identify how these differences take their 
expression in actual practices on national level. After conducting nine interviews with 
representatives from six enforcement bodies around Europe, we find that, despite 
unified efforts to bridge the gap in enforcement, country level enforcement differ in a 
number of ways. The significant differences documented in this paper can be divided 
into seven areas and provide useful insights for improvements of the European 
cooperation.  
 
• Structures – Sweden and Ireland are the two enforcers that are most restricted 
due to structural dilemmas.  
• Resources – Ireland is the only country to openly admit being under-
resourced, however, several other countries also experience difficulties.   
• Legal authority – Having the possibility to act against the issuer has shown to 
be as important as what is actually being done.  
• Examination approach – The information available to enforcers differs 
considerably, where amongst the Netherlands stands out by only reviewing 
public available information, hampering their ability to identify misstatements. 
• Results of examination – Differences in timeliness and strictness of actions 
can potentially create regulatory arbitrage as issuers seek to list in the 
legislative environment most suitable to their needs.   
• Sanctions – Enforcers apply the same benchmark for when sanctions shall be 
imposed, however, the available measures differ across countries. 
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• European cooperation – Differences in frequency of cases sent to the EECS 
and how the database is applied, leads to a potential trade-off between 
harmonization and principles-based enforcement.  
 
These findings also highlight that differences are not limited to differences in national 
legislation, even when national legislation do not establish boundaries to act 
homogenously, differences are still evident.  
 
In interpreting our findings, two additional findings are worth mentioning. First, 
differences are apparent when viewed as individual processes, however, when 
coupling the individual processes the results are not as prominent.  These findings 
bring to question whether the differences actually are to be viewed as significant. 
Second, when viewed in the light of the European cooperation, we find that all 
enforcers strive towards the same goal; the significant differences only show different 
paths towards it. 
 
The results of this study also bring to light some of the difficulties in separating actual 
practices from differences ‘on paper’. Enforcement is simply not a concept that can be 
described in black and white; what actually is being done is somewhat intertwined 
with the legal authority and the threat of acting against an issuer. 
  
To this end, the key message of this paper is that there are significant differences in 
how enforcement is carried out on national level and that these differences are likely 
to persist. In analysing these findings, we however, question whether these 
differences should be viewed as a threat to uniform interpretation of IFRS.  
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7.2	  Limitations	  &	  suggested	  future	  research	  
This study is limited to a homogeneous group of countries, which could be labelled as 
‘small countries in northern Europe’. By excluding influential countries as UK, 
Germany and France it is difficult to achieve a complete image of the enforcement 
system in Europe, hence the availability to draw general conclusions is limited. Given 
this, we find it interesting to conduct a similar study including the countries 
mentioned above. 
 
In line with prior literature, resources seem to be of crucial importance for proper 
enforcement. Due, to the scope of this study, we were not able to investigate this area 
to the extent necessary in order to analyse its full impact. We believe that a 
quantitative study measuring the availability of resources and resource allocation 
among European enforcers would contribute greatly to the field of research.  
 
It is put forward in prior research that there exist several differences between the 
decentralized enforcement system in Europe and the centralized in US. SEC has the 
intention to adopt IFRS, however arguing that the decentralized structure in Europe is 
an obstacle in the way of global convergence. Thus, we would like to suggest a study 
comparing the enforcement systems in Europe and the US. 
 
We further limited this study to mandatory adopters connected to ESMA. It would be 
interesting to conduct a study, comparing mandatory adopters in the EU with 
voluntary adopters outside the EU. 
 
Some major differences and their potential implications discussed in this study are 
also acknowledged by ESMA in the consultation paper. It will be interesting to 
conduct a similar study after the new guidelines have been implemented in order to 
investigate whether the problems documented in this paper remains. 
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9.	  Appendix	  
 
Appendix	  1	  –	  Questionnaire	  	  
 
Phase 1: Introduction  -­‐ Short presentation (position, tenure and job assignments)   
 -­‐ How is the organization structured? 
o Tasks of the enforcement unit/area of responsibility 
o Other tasks and responsibilities besides enforcement of financial 
reporting?  
o Number of employees at the enforcement unit?  
 -­‐ How do you cooperate with ESMA and how is the information 
communicated?  
o How is the information transformed into practical work?  
 -­‐ Are you involved in any bilateral collaboration? (e.g with enforcement bodies 
in other countries) 
 -­‐ Is access to resources a limitation in your work? (i.e, can you investigate the 
way that is most appropriate with current resources) 
o If you had access to more resources would you investigate more 
companies or engage in more thorough investigations? 
	  
Phase 2: In preparation of the supervisory review -­‐ How do you select which companies to review? 
o Are there guidelines how often firms are to be reviewed?  
o Are there any differences related to type of business? (e.g size, 
industry, level of risk) 
 
 -­‐ How do you determine focus areas?  (e.g from national perspective, guidelines 
from ESMA, in cooperation with other regulatory bodies) 
 -­‐ Describe the contact with selected firms 
o Tools during the review 
 -­‐ Is it possible for companies to receive pre-clearance? 
 -­‐ To what extent do your unit use external services? (e.g consultants to help 
with the initial evaluation)  
 -­‐ Do you have the right to request other information other than what your unit 
produce? (e.g auditor’s reports or files) 
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-­‐ Are you working proactively in any specific way? 
o Issue accounting guidance statements? 
o National guidelines? 
o Others? 
 
Phase 3: During the review -­‐ Briefly describe how the practical enforcement/supervision is carried out.  
 -­‐ What do you review? Which documents/factors are the most important? 
o Where do you conduct the review? (i.e actual location) 
o How do you contact firms during the investigation? (e.g meetings, 
email, letters) 
 -­‐ How do you describe a violation and how do you identify it? 
o Are there differences between types of violation? (e.g violation, 
deviation and inadequacy)  
! Violation that require disciplinary action 
! Violation without specific action 
! Material / non-material violation 
o If yes: how does the treatment/sanctions of these differ?   
 -­‐ How do you assess materiality? 
o Where is the line between ‘correctable errors’ and errors that require 
public release?  
 -­‐ How do you proceed when you have located a violation? 
o In contact with the issuer 
 -­‐ On average, how much time do you need for one initial review? (Initial refers 
to the first phase where the first assessment of the financial statement is 
reviewed) 
 -­‐ How is a review finished and how is it reported in conjunction with the 
completion? 
 
Phase 4: After a review has been finished -­‐ Which sanctions do you have at your disposal?  
 -­‐ Do you have time limits on when the supervisory review must be completed?  
o If yes: what will be the effect if this goal is not reached?     
 -­‐ How is the outcome of your review implemented? 
o ”name and shame” 
o Public announcement  
o Request correction 
o Direct or forward 
 -­‐ In practice, how do you work with follow-ups? 
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Phase 5: European Cooperation -­‐ How do you contribute to the European Cooperation on enforcement? 
o What types of cases do you bring to ESMA? 
o Frequency on cases to EECS? 
 -­‐ What role does the accumulated database has for your interpretation and 
enforcement of IFRS? 
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Appendix	  2	  –	  Structure	  of	  Financial	  Supervision	  in	  Europe	  
 
Former structure (pre 2011):  
 
(Source: Andersson, T. (2010) Eu:s framtida tillsyn – kommer den att fungera?. Valuta- och 
Penningpolitik. Stockholm: Riksbanken, pp. 46-70 [the researchers translation].) 
 
 
Current structure (post 2011):  
 
(Source: Andersson, T. (2010) Eu:s framtida tillsyn – kommer den att fungera?. Valuta- och 
Penningpolitik. Stockholm: Riksbanken, pp. 46-70 [the researchers translation).)	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Appendix	  3	  –	  List	  of	  Enforcers	  	  
	  
(Source: European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). (2013) Activity Report of the IFRS 
Enforcement activities in Europe in 2012.  pp. 21-22.) 
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Appendix	  4	  –	  Brief	  description	  of	  respondents	  
• Sweden 
o SFSA (Finansinspektionen) 
Patrik Jakobsson, head of financial reporting supervision since 2007. 
Background as auditor at KPMG. 
Hans Hällefors (Pilot-interview), former Financial Reporting Specialist at 
Finansinspektionen (2010-2012).  
o OMX 
Jan Buisman, Accounting expert and Consultant in financial reporting 
supervision since 2010. Background as auditor. 
Anna Jansson, Financial reporting since 2009. Background as company 
lawyer at ‘Aktiespararna’. 
o NGM 
Markus Ramström, head of Market Surveillance since 2010. Previously at 
the Market Surveillance unit at NasdaqOMX Stockholm. 
 
• Denmark 
o   DFSA (Finanstilsynet) 
Mads Mathiassen, Director at Financial Reporting Division, since 2009. 
Started in the Danish FSA in 2006. 
Tine Heerup, Deputy Director in the same unit, been in the DFSA for 25 
years. 
o   DBA 
Jan-Christian Nilsen, Chief special advisor at DBA since 1994. 
 
• Norway 
o   FSAN (Finanstilsynet) 
Tine Svae, Special advisor at financial reporting. In the FSAN since 2008. 
Former senior partner at PwC. 
 
• Netherlands 
o   AFM 
Annemeike Keijzer-Peijffers, Senior Supervisor, has worked with market 
surveillance since 2005, background in auditing at Deloitte. 
 
• Ireland 
o   IAASA 
Michael Kavanagh, Head of Financial Reporting Supervision since 2006. 
Background as Director Professional Standards at KPMG. 
Garett Ryan, Project manager in Financial Reporting Supervision unit 
since 2009. 
 
• Belgium 
o   FSMA 
Johan Lembreght, Coordinator at Accountancy and Finance Supervision of 
listed companies. Started in the FSMA in 1990. 
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Appendix	  5	  –	  ‘Levels	  of	  non-­‐compliance’	  
 
• Netherlands:  
o Notification: A notification can either be informal or formal. The 
informal approach does not involve any correspondence with the board 
of supervisors. In the formal approach both the board of the company 
and the board of supervisors are engaged. Both types of notifications 
are finished with instructions to correct in future reports. 
o Recommendation: A material misstatement that is deemed to 
influence the users of the financial information. The company is 
requested to issue a press release in order to inform the market. If 
compliance is still not reached the case may go to court where all 
rulings are made publicly available. 
• Sweden:  
o OMX:  
! ‘Reminder’: Non-material misstatement. The misstatement is 
brought to the attention of the issuer, but not further action is 
required.  
! ‘Comment’: Formal misstatements regarding disclosures. 
Reach a certain level of materiality without provoking severe 
action.  All cases are finished with correction in future reports.  
! ‘Criticism’: Material misstatement that may affect an investor. 
All cases are made publicly available on their website, 
anonymously.  
! ‘Disciplinary committee’: If the violation is considered to 
cause harm to investors or otherwise be detrimental to market 
confidence, the matter can be handed over to the Disciplinary 
Committee, which have the right to give verdict containing a 
possible sanction.  
o NGM:  
! ‘Comment’: Non-material disclosure formalities. The issuer is 
informed about the misstatement, but no further action is 
required. 
! ‘Remark’: Material misstatement, used for either several 
deviations according to the above mentioned or one severe 
misstatements that could affect investors or market confidence. 
Future correction or if more severe, demand for the issuer to 
issue a press release or new annual report. These cases are 
made publicly available at their website, anonymously.  
! ‘Disciplinary Committee’: Severe material misstatement that 
may affect the valuation of the company and/or the overall 
assessment of the issuer. Only used when other measures seems 
inadequate. 
• Ireland:  
o The terminology used by the IAASA is compliance and non-
compliance, whit that said there are still levels of non-compliance 
driving the severity of actions. In principle, the formal options 
available to the IAASA follow the actions outlined by ESMA. 
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• Norway: 
o FSAN use similar terminology as the IAASA, the level of materiality 
drives the severity of the action. In general the most common action 
used by the FSAN is ‘correction in the next financial statement’.  
• Denmark:  
o Infringement: Departures that are more formal in nature (e.g 
misplacement of disclosures) or where materiality is difficult to assess. 
The action tied to infringement is to correct in future financial 
statement. 
o Misstatement: Departures that are labelled as significant to investors. 
Material misstatement always demand immediate action, either 
corrective note or issuance of new information (if close to the next 
financial reporting period future correction is acceptable). 
• Belgium: 
o The FSMA focuses on investors and the severity of actions is tied to 
the need of the investor. If a misstatement is considered vital to the 
market an immediate action is required (i.e corrective note or issuance 
of a revised financial statement). If the misstatement, on the other 
hand, is considered less vital, correction in future reports is acceptable. 
There is no formal terminology in place, which action to use is decided 
in each specific case. 
 
 
